The use of secret keys in broadcast channels with receiver side information is studied. The particular scenario is analyzed where a transmitter wants to send two confidential messages to two receivers, while keeping an external eavesdropper ignorant. Each receiver has one of the confidential messages as side information available for decoding. In addition to that, the transmitter shares independent secret keys of arbitrary rates with both receivers. The secret keys can be used in different ways: They can act as one-time pads to encrypt the confidential messages or they can be used as randomization resources for wiretap coding. Both approaches are discussed and an achievable rate region based on superposition coding is established for the one-time pad approach. For the wiretap coding approach, the secrecy capacity for degraded channels is derived. In the optimal coding scheme, the available secret keys are used as the randomization part of the wiretap code to keep the eavesdropper ignorant. In establishing the capacity region, a new upper bound on the sumrate is derived. This bound shows that in an optimal coding scheme, in the degraded case, the total equivocation-rate of the (opposite) secret-keys at the legitimate receivers must equal the equivocationrate of the secret-keys at the eavesdropper, when informed about the messages.
INTRODUCTION
Ongoing developments in communication systems make information available almost everywhere. Along with this, it is an important task to secure sensitive information from unauthorized access. This applies in particular to wireless communication systems which are inherently vulnerable due to the open nature of the wireless medium. In fact, transmitted signals are received by intended users but are also easily eavesdropped by non-legitimate receivers.
The problem of secure communication from an information theoretic perspective was first studied by Shannon in [1] . In this work, transmitter and receiver share a secret key which is unknown to an external eavesdropper. Such a secret key can then be used by the legitimate users as a one-time pad to perfectly protect the confidential message from the eavesdropper. Subsequently, Wyner introduced in [2] the so-called wiretap channel which models the scenario with one legitimate transmitterreceiver pair and one external eavesdropper to be kept ignorant. In contrast to [1] , there is no secret key available so that secure communication must be established by solely exploiting the properties of the noisy channel. Later, this was generalized by Csiszár and Körner in [3] to the broadcast channel with confidential messages. Recently, this area of information theoretic secrecy has drawn attention as it provides a promising approach to embed secure communication in wireless networks; for instance see [4] [5] [6] [7] and references therein. Information theoretic secrecy concepts have then been extended to multi-user scenarios such as several variations of the broadcast channel [3, [8] [9] [10] , the multiple access channel [11] , or the interference channel [12] . But all these works have in common that no shared secret keys are available at the legitimate users.
A shared secret key available at transmitter and receiver has only been studied for the wiretap channel [13] [14] [15] , where [13, 14] studied this from a rate-distortion point of view. Then, [15] established the secrecy capacity of the wiretap channel with shared key for the case of no distortion allowed at the legitimate receiver. Related to this is the problem of the wiretap channel with secure feedback, where the feedback, basically, allows to create a shared secret key [16] [17] [18] .
In this paper, we study the broadcast channel (BC) with receiver side information and independent secret keys as introduced in Section 2. In this communication scenario, the transmitter wants to send two confidential messages to two receivers, while keeping an external eavesdropper ignorant of them. Each receiver has one of the confidential messages as side information available for decoding. In addition to that, the transmitter shares independent secret keys, one with each receiver.
Secure communication can now be achieved by different approaches. As shared secret keys of arbitrary rates are available at the transmitter and both receivers, it suggests itself to use them as one-time pads to encrypt the confidential messages as in [1] . Unfortunately, each receiver is aware of only one secret key. Thus, the more one secret key is used to protect the message for one receiver, the more the other receiver is hurt as the (unknown) secret key acts as interference to him. This approach is analyzed in Section 3, where an achievable rate region based on superposition coding is derived.
On the other hand, the transmitter can apply the information theoretic secrecy concepts of wiretap coding by exploiting the properties of the noisy channels [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] . In this approach, parts of the available resources have to be used for additional randomization to "confuse" the eavesdropper reducing the remaining resources for the transmission of the confidential messages. In Section 4 this approach is analyzed and the secrecy capacity is derived for degraded channels. It is shown that it is optimal to use the available secret keys not Fig. 1 . Broadcast channel with receiver side information, where the transmitter shares an independent secret key with each receiver.
as one-time pads but as the randomization part of the wiretap code.
The communication problem at hand can be motivated, for example, by the concept of bidirectional relaying in a three-node network, in which a relay node establishes bidirectional communication between two other nodes using a decode-and-forward protocol [19] [20] [21] [22] . In the initial multiple access phase, both nodes transmit their messages and also additional secret keys to the relay node. Then, the succeeding broadcast phase corresponds to the BC with receiver side information and independent secret keys considered here. 1 
BROADCAST CHANNEL WITH RECEIVER SIDE INFORMATION AND INDEPENDENT SECRET KEYS
In this paper we study the broadcast channel (BC) with receiver side information and independent secret keys as depicted in Fig. 1 . Let X and Y1, Y2, Z be finite input and output sets. For input and output sequences x n ∈ X n and y
of length n, the discrete memoryless broadcast channel is given by
The transmitter wants to send confidential messages M2 and M1 to receivers 1 and 2 respectively, while each receiver has the other message as side information available for decoding. The transmitter shares independent secret keys K1 and K2 of arbitrary rates with receivers 1 and 2. All messages and keys are assumed to be independent of each other and uniformly distributed over the sets Mi := {1, ..., Mi,n} and Ki := {1, ..., Ki,n}, i = 1, 2. We also write M12 = (M1, M2), K12 = (K1, K2), M12 := M1 × M2, and K12 := K1 × K2 for short.
Definition 1. An (n, M1,n, M2,n, K1,n, K2,n)-code for the BC with receiver side information and independent secret keys consists of a (stochastic) encoder
i.e., a stochastic matrix, and decoders at receivers 1 and 2 Then for an (n, M1,n, M2,n, K1,n, K2,n)-code, the average probability of decoding error at receiver 1 is given bȳ
The average probability of decoding errorē2,n at receiver 2 is defined accordingly.
To keep the confidential messages secret from the eavesdropper, we impose the strong secrecy [23, 24] requirement
for δn > 0 with M12 = (M1, M2) and Z n = (Z1, ..., Zn) the output at the eavesdropper. This requires (M1, M2) to be jointly secure from the eavesdropper. Then, (4) implies that the individual criteria I(M1; Z n ) ≤ δn and I(M2; Z n ) ≤ δn are satisfied as well.
+ is said to be achievable for the BC with receiver side information and independent secret keys if for any τ > 0 there exists an n(τ ) ∈ N and a sequence of (n, M1,n, M2,n, K1,n, K2,n)-codes such that for all n ≥ n(τ ) we have
The set of all achievable rate pairs is the secrecy capacity region CS. 2 In principle, there are two different methods possible to keep the confidential messages secret. The transmitter can follow the idea of information theoretic secrecy or wiretap coding by using a channel code that exploits the nature of the wireless channel to keep the messages secret [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] . On the other hand, the availability of shared secret keys suggests itself to use a one-time pad approach which protects the messages with the help of the secret keys [1] . In the following we analyze these different approaches in more detail.
SECRET KEYS AS ONE-TIME PAD
Let us start with the one-time pad approach, where the secret keys are used to mask the confidential messages keeping them perfectly secret from the eavesdropper. Basically, the idea is to use secret keys of the same rates as the corresponding messages, i.e., |K1| = |M2| and |K2| = |M1|, to create "new" messages based on a bit-wise XOR operation as
and to encode and transmit these messages to the corresponding receivers. Having decoded the XOR-ed messages M2 and M1, each receiver can use his secret key to obtain the desired confidential message, i.e., M2 ⊗ K1 = M2 ⊗ K1 ⊗ K1 = M2 and M1 ⊗ K2 = M1 ⊗ K2 ⊗ K2 = M1 respectively. As all keys and messages are independent of each other, the confidential messages are kept perfectly secret from the eavesdropper, i.e., I(M1, M2; Z n ) = 0, even if he is able to decode the XOR-ed messages M1 and M2. Applying the one-time pad approach in this way, the problem at hand reduces to the broadcast channel problem with two independent individual messages. Thus, one can apply classical strategies such as superposition coding, cf. for example [25, Sec. 5.2] , to encode and transmit the XOR-ed messages.
Proposition 1 (Superposition Coding). An achievable rate region for the BC with receiver side information and independent secret keys is given by all rate pairs (R1, R2) ∈ R 2 + that satisfy
for random variables satisfying the Markov chain U −X −(Y1, Y2).
This approach solely relies on using the secret keys as one-time pads and does not take advantage of the properties of the wireless channel by applying wiretap coding approaches. Thus, such an approach might not be optimal in general. However, for scenarios where the channel to the eavesdropper is "stronger" than the channels to the legitimate receivers, we observe the following.
Remark 1. If the channels to the legitimate receivers are degraded with respect to the eavesdropper channel, i.e., we have the Markov chains X − Z − Y1 and X − Z − Y2, then the confidential messages can be kept secret from the eavesdropper by using the secret keys as one-time pads.
Wiretap coding approaches will always fail in such scenarios as they require the legitimate channel to be "stronger" than the eavesdropper channel.
SECRET KEYS AS PART OF WIRETAP CODES
Here we want to explore the case where the secret keys are used as parts of the wiretap code and not as one-time pads. The basic idea of wiretap coding is not to use all available resources for transmitting the desired messages, but to spend some of the resources to "confuse" the eavesdropper by applying randomized encoding strategies [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] . If a sufficient amount of resources is spent for the confusion, the eavesdropper will not be able to decode the desired confidential messages. Obviously, the more resources are spent for the confusion, the less resources are available for the actual message transmission. Here is where the secret keys enter the picture in this approach. They will not be used as a one-time pad, but as resources for the confusion.
In the following we consider the case where the legitimate channels are stronger than the eavesdropper channel in the sense that they form Markov chains X − Y1 − Z and X − Y2 − Z. Then, the secrecy capacity region is given by the following theorem.
Theorem 1. The secrecy capacity region for the degraded BC with receiver side information and independent secret keys is given by all rate pairs
for random variables satisfying X − Y1 − Z and X − Y2 − Z.
Proof of Achievability
In the following we outline the proof of achievability. To do so, we first observe that for any fixed input distribution, the desired region given by (7) can equivalently be expressed as
for all 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. Thus, instead of proving the achievability of (7), we show that the rates given in (8) are achievable with strong secrecy for all 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
Key Ideas
The proof of achievability is based on the following two main ingredients:
1. Wiretap coding for strong secrecy. The transmitter uses a stochastic encoder so that the codewords x n mk consist of two indices: one for the confidential message m ∈ M and one for additional randomization k ∈ K to confuse the eavesdropper. In particular, for the classical wiretap channel, choosing the rate for the randomization as 1 n log |K| > I(X; Z) +
for some small > 0, i.e., |K| > 2 n(I(X;Z)+ ) , allows to show that strong secrecy, i.e., I(M ; Z n ) ≤ δn, is satisfied at the eavesdropper. This has been demonstrated for example in [7, 26, 27] for the classical wiretap channel and in [10] for the BC with receiver side information. Traditionally, the legitimate receiver has to decode both the confidential message and the randomization index, which is possible as we have |M||K| < 2 n(I(X;Y )− ) codewords in total. Thus, for the rate of the confidential message remains
i.e., |M| < 2 n(I(X;Y )−I(X;Z)−2 ) , cf. also [4, 7] .
Coding for the BC with receiver side information.
The transmitter encodes both messages m1 ∈ M1 and m2 ∈ M2 into one codeword x n m 1 m 2 ∈ X n based on the network coding idea [21, 22] . The crucial observation is that the available complementary side information at the receivers allow them to reduce the number of possible messages. In more detail, we chose rates
i.e., |M2| < 2 n(I(X;Y 1 )− ) and |M1| < 2 n(I(X;Y 2 )− ) , so that in total we generate |M1||M2| codewords x n m 1 m 2 ∈ X n . In principle, the total rate of the codewords is above the respective capacities of the user's channels. However, the available side information allows each receiver to "cancel" out one index reducing the remaining rate below the respective capacity making reliable communication possible at the rates given in (11), cf. [21, 22, 28] .
Sketch of Proof
Having these two main ideas in mind, we are ready to prove the achievability of the rates given in (8) for any 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. We follow the coding scheme presented in [10, 26] and define for any given input distribution PX ∈ P(X ) the probability measure
PX (xi) and T n X,δ is the set of δ-typical sequences, cf [29] . Now, according to P X n , we generate |M1||M2||K1||K2| independent codewords x
The important difference to the classical wiretap coding approach is that instead of generating "dummy" randomization indices, we use the available secret keys as randomization resources.
As the amount of randomization resources satisfy
we can show similarly as in [10, 26] that I(M1, M2; Z n ) ≤ δn holds so that the strong secrecy requirement (4) is satisfied.
Let us now turn to the legitimate receivers. Receiver 1 has m1 ∈ M1 and k1 ∈ K1 as side information available and is interested in the confidential message m2 ∈ M2. Due to his side information, the unknown indices to receiver 1 are m2 ∈ M2 and k2 ∈ K2 of size |M2||K2| ≈ 2 n(I(X;Y 1 )− ) .
(15) It can be easily shown that this means that he is able to decode the remaining indices m2 ∈ M2 and k2 ∈ K2 so that R1 ≤ I(X; Y1)− αI(X; Z) is an achievable rate for the confidential message M2, cf. (8a).
Similarly, receiver 2 has m2 ∈ M2 and k2 ∈ K2 as side information so that the number of possible unknown indices reduces to |M1||K1| ≈ 2
which means that he is able to decode the remaining indices m1 ∈ M1 and k1 ∈ K1 so that R2 ≤ I(X; Y2) − (1 − α)I(X; Z) is an achievable rate for the confidential message M1, cf. (8b).
Discussion
In the classical wiretap coding, a certain amount of resources (≈ I(X; Z)) has to be used for additional randomization to keep the eavesdropper ignorant. This results in a loss in rates of the confidential messages. Using the secret keys for this randomization has the advantage that parts of the additional randomization are already as side information available at the receivers. This reduces the loss in confidential rate in the sense that the rate is only reduced by the remaining unknown randomization part.
Proof of Converse
It remains to show the optimality of the above presented approach, i.e., there are no other rate pairs achievable than those given in (7) .
The bounds (7a) and (7b) are the obvious single-user bounds and follow immediately. The main part is to prove the bound (7c) on the sum-rate.
We have the following versions of Fano's inequality
Following the classical approach for the wiretap channel [4, 7] , we obtain for the sum-rate
with n = δn + 1,n + 2,n and n → 0 as n → ∞. The steps follow from the secrecy condition (4), Fano's inequalities, the chain rule for mutual information, and the fact that
To see the last step, we write
where the first step follows from the definition of mutual information, the second step from the fact that M1, M2, K1, and K2 are independent so that −H(K1|M12, K2) − H(K2|M12, K1) + H(K12) = 0, the third step from the Markov chains X − Y1 − Z and X −Y2 −Z due to the degradedness of the channels, and the last step from the chain rule of entropy. Now, we can bound the sum-rate as follows where the second step follows from the degradedness of the channels, the third step from the data processing inequality, the fourth step from the memoryless property of the channel, and the last step again from the degradedness. The upper bound on the sum-rate shows that in an optimal coding scheme, the total equivocation-rate of the (opposite) secret-keys at the legitimate receivers must equal the equivocation-rate of the secret-keys at the eavesdropper, when informed about the messages.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied the BC with receiver side information and independent secret keys. In this communication problem, multiple secret keys are shared among the legitimate users. We asked the question how these keys should be used to securely transmit confidential messages to their respective receivers keeping an external eavesdropper ignorant of them. For reversely degraded channels, i.e., the eavesdropper channel is "stronger" than the legitimate channels, the confidential messages can be securely transmitted by using the secret keys as one-time pads. On the other hand, if the channels are degraded in the sense that the legitimate channels are "stronger" than the eavesdropper channel, it is optimal to use the secret keys not as one-time pads but as randomization resources for wiretap coding. Thus, the optimal use of secret keys is not obvious and open for the general case.
